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MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY SWO RETENTION 
BONUSES:  AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO THE 






This purpose of this project was to use an experimental approach to examine the 
behavior patterns in the decision-making process when choosing between monetary and 
non-monetary retention bonuses.  We expected to observe that experimental subjects 
would choose incentives that maximize their personal retention value.  The experiment is 
a retention mechanism that optimally combines monetary and non-monetary incentives to 
achieve desired SWO retention.  The goal is to develop combinations of incentives that 
reduce retention bonus costs while maximizing individual self-interests.     
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A.  PURPOSE 
This project evaluates the retention impact and the Navy’s cost savings of offering 
an individually designed combination of non-monetary and monetary incentives to 
members of the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community.  The SWO community is 
suffering its lowest retention rate since the early 1990s.  SWOs hesitate to remain in their 
warfare community through the completion of two consecutive department head at sea 
tours to fulfill additional sea duty assignments once they complete their initial 
commissioning obligation commitment.1   
As a result, the Navy introduced two separate monetary bonuses to increase 
retention rates within the SWO community.  However, the bonuses have done little to 
raise retention to the levels the Navy desires.  The SWO community is actively seeking 
another form of incentive to increase retention rates.   
Previous research conducted by students and professors at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) identified incentives SWOs most desired.  Additionally, combinatorial 
auction research may prove useful in developing tools to combine the incentives into 
packages at a low cost to the Navy.  This project will use an experimental approach to 
examine the decision-making process SWOs might use when choosing between monetary 
and non-monetary retention bonuses.  We expect to observe that experimental subjects 
will choose incentives that maximize their personal retention value.  The experiment is a 
retention mechanism that optimally combines monetary and non-monetary incentives to 
achieve desired SWO retention.  The goal is to develop combinations of incentives that 
reduce retention bonus costs while maximizing individual self-interests.   
                                                 
1  Constance M. Denmond, Derek N. Johnson, Chavius G. Lewis and Christopher R. Zegley, 
“Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied to the Selection of Surface Warfare Officer Retention Incentives” 
(MBA Professional Report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
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B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This research will achieve the following objectives aimed at increasing the 
Navy’s SWO retention rates: 
Primary Objective: 
 Develop a retention mechanism that optimally combines monetary and non-
monetary incentives to achieve desired SWO retention rates. 
Secondary Objective:  
 Monitor the individual decisions through an experimental approach to the 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This project investigates the potential for allowing SWOs to combine individually 
chosen non-monetary incentives (NMIs) with already existing monetary incentives to 
create an optimal personalized incentive package sufficient to meet the Navy’s SWO 
retention goal.  The project begins by investigating the history of Surface Warfare and 
describing the issues challenging SWO retention.  Next, the project will describe the 
history and aims of the Navy’s current monetary incentives.  The authors will use the data 
from previous NPS projects to run an experiment exploring the functionality of a 
retention mechanism that optimally combines monetary and non-monetary incentives.   
The methodology for this Master of Business Administration (MBA) project will 
involve both qualitative and quantitative data.  Our data collection method will consist of 
the following: 
 Develop an experiment based on CRAM and a reverse auction system.  
 Administer the experiment to NPS students in the Monterey area. 
 Monitor the individuals’ behavior during the decision-making process when 
choosing between monetary and non-monetary retention bonuses.  
The exact details of the experiment will be described in detail in Chapter V. 
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D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I describes the purpose of this MBA project and lists the questions the 
project intends to address.  Chapter II is a literature review detailing the history of the 
Surface Warfare community and the current SWO bonuses offered by the Navy.  The 
chapter describes in depth the bonuses and why they are ineffective in attaining the 
retention Navy’s goals.  Chapter III describes the retention mechanism; explaining 
monetary retention incentives, non-monetary retention incentives, second-priced sealed 
bid auctions, and the CRAM used to develop the experiment.  Chapter IV gives in depth 
descriptions of experimental economics and explains price theory experiments, game 
theory experiments, and individual decision theory experiments.  Chapter V describes the 
experiment design used in this thesis and provides the experimental results, as well as the 
conclusion to our project and recommendations for further research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is commonly argued that the best asset of any military force is its people.  
While the Navy builds the most technologically advanced aircraft carriers and state-of-
the-art multi-functional destroyers, all war-fighting tools are useless without highly 
trained personnel to operate them.  Another component that is vital to our military 
effectiveness is leadership.  Without strong, positive, knowledgeable leaders shaping both 
the professional and personal lives of the men and women they lead, an aircraft carrier 
would not function properly nor could a guided missile destroyer fulfill its missions. 
Retention of qualified and motivated officers in the Surface Warfare community 
is vital for the United States Navy’s future success.  Life onboard surface ships creates 
many challenges, from leaving one’s family and friends for, on average, six months while 
on deployment, to having very little or no privacy while underway.  In addition, the Navy 
has adopted the philosophy of doing more with less and optimizing the manpower 
available.  The manpower plan has put further strain on the already difficult life of a 
SWO.  Having to be a leader and a manager, the common SWO finds himself swamped 
with several different tasks, and struggling to complete these tasks. Research conducted 
in 2006 by Sharron Graham at the Naval Postgraduate School explains, in detail, the 
plethora of reasons why SWOs decide to leave the warfare community.  The SWO 
community has to maintain 275 Department Head positions to sustain current operational 
commitments.2  Low retention carries a high cost for the Navy.   
The Navy spends several years and hundreds of thousands of dollars to develop 
its SWOs into apt ship drivers and leaders.  A four-year college education is a 
requirement for most SWOs.  Although the Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps 
                                                 
2 Navy Personnel Command PERS41, SWO Career Planning Brief, 
http://www.npc.Navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/71C709C7-0D35-4329-9257-
CEF93B366A38/0/SWOCareerPlanningBrief0903.pdf (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
March 18, 2009). 
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(ROTC) is the largest SWO commissioning source, the United States Naval Academy 
(USNA) ranks second in the number of SWOs annually commissioned.3  The total cost to 
educate a Midshipman through four years at the Naval Academy is $351,800.4  Before 
SWOs with the rank of Lieutenant can make the commitment to become a Department 
Head, they must spend two years at the Ensign grade and two years as a Lieutenant 
Junior Grade.  The current pay for an Ensign is $2,763 monthly; for a Lieutenant Junior 
Grade the pay is $3,483 monthly.5  For this example, the government’s total 
undiscounted expense for four years of commissioned service is $149,904.  Add the price 
associated with attending USNA and the cost jumps to $501,704.  This serves as a lower-
bound estimate because it does not consider the allowance the Navy provides for 
healthcare, rent (basic allowance for housing (BAH)), and food (basic allowance for 
subsistence (BAS)).  Those amounts vary based on duty location.  Also, the estimate does 
not account for the cost of various other required officer schools a SWO attends to 
maintain nautical proficiency.   
1. History of the Surface Warfare Officer 
On October 13, 1775, the Continental Congress voted to outfit two sailing vessels, 
armed with carriage and swivel guns and manned by crews of eighty men, and sent them 
out on a three month mission to intercept transport ships carrying supplies to the British 
in America.6  This initial action of Congress gave birth to what is now the United States 
Navy.  Currently expanded to encompass several different mission areas, on the sea, in  
 
 
                                                 
3 Constance M. Denmond, Derek N. Johnson, Chavius G. Lewis and Christopher R. Zegley, 
"Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied to the Selection of Surface Warfare Officer Retention Incentives" 
(MBA professional report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
4 Get Into Academy, Updated Value of Education for USNA, USMA, and USAFA, January 1, 2007, 
http://www.getintoacademy.com/57/updated-2007-2008-value-of-education-for-usma-usna-and-usafa/ 
(accessed March 18, 2009). 
5 Defense Finance and Accounting Service, DFAS - Military Pay Tables, January 1, 2009, 
http://www.dfas.mil/militarypay/militarypaytables.html (accessed March 18, 2009). 
6 Naval History and Heritage Command, The Birth of the United States Navy, October 4, 2000, 
http://www.history.Navy.mil/faqs/faq31-1.htm (accessed March 18, 2009). 
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the air, and under the sea, the birthplace and backbone of the Navy remains the surface 
fleet.  The Surface Warfare community is the oldest community in the United States 
Navy.7 
2. Surface Warfare Officer Career Path  
Once officers earn a commission in the Navy and begin their career path as a 
career designated SWO, the new officers report immediately to a surface ship.  New 
officers do not attend any formal school, but are expected to learn their job through on 
the job training (OJT).  Once onboard the ship, officers start learning of all the various 
tasks required.  Officers are given a division to manage and must juggle leading their men 
while also learning the watchstanding responsibilities of positions such as conning 
officer, combat information center watch officer, and officer of the deck.  Once qualified 
through the formal boarding process in these three watchstations, officers are sent to a 
three-week long Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) in Newport, Rhode Island, 
where they learns about all the different communities of the United States Navy, ranging 
from Marine Battalions to Aircraft Carriers, and the basics of certain weapons systems 
and war fighting tactics.  SWOS qualifies officers for the Surface Warfare community; 
upon completion, they are designated as SWOs and earn their Surface Warfare pin.  The 
officers earn this pin through an intense interview board with their ship’s Commanding 
Officer and the Department Heads on his ship.  An officer is given 18 months to earn the 
warfare pin and become designated as a qualified SWO. 
The progression of a junior SWO is a standard one.  A new officer will spend a 
total of 45 months assigned to a seagoing command for what is considered their first and 
second Division Officer tours.  Upon completing the first and second Division Officer 




                                                 
7 Sharron Graham, “An Exploratory Study: Female Surface Warfare Officers' Decisions to Leave 
Their Community” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006). 
 8
month mark, not taking the SWO retention bonus while signing on for a two to three year 
shore duty assignment, or taking the SWO bonus and obligating themselves for the next 
six years as a Navy SWO.8  
3. History of Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) 
The Navy realized that a significant number of officers chose to leave the Surface 
Warfare community after their initial service obligation, compromising the Navy’s ability 
to fill SWO Department Head billets.  To combat the outflow of qualified officers, the 
Navy created a system of monetary incentives.  Currently, the Navy offers two monetary 
incentives aimed at increasing SWO retention.  The first Navy bonus was SWO 
Continuation Pay (SWOCP).  SWOCP was established and implemented in FY 2000.9  
The SWOCP bonus is a $50,000 bonus aimed to entice SWOs to stay in the Surface 
Warfare community long enough to complete the full Department Head tour requirement, 
essentially adding three years, divided into two, eighteen month tours of active sea duty 
to the initial commissioning commitment.10  The Navy expected the bonus to combat the 
outflow of officers from the Surface Warfare community.  Initially, the monetary 
incentive did help to retain officers, but retention again began to fall over the years. 
Officers elected to leave the community even with the initial monetary bonus. 
4. History of Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
(SWO CSRB) 
Still experiencing a decrease in retention, the Navy had to restructure its 
incentives to retain quality officers and stop them from leaving the Surface Warfare 
community and either transferring to another warfare community or separating from the 
military.  Thus, the FY 2006 Defense Appropriation Act established a second SWO 
                                                 
8Navy Personnel Command PERS41, SWO Career Planning Brief, 
http://www.npc.Navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/71C709C7-0D35-4329-9257-
CEF93B366A38/0/SWOCareerPlanningBrief0903.pdf (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
March 18, 2009). 
9 Secretary of the Navy, SECNAVINST 7220.84 Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay, Instruction 
(Washington, DC: SECNAV, 2000). 
10 Secretary of the Navy, SECNAVINST 7220.84 Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay, 
Instruction (Washington, DC: SECNAV, 2000). 
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bonus, the SWO Critical Skills Retention Bonus (SWO CSRB).11  The SWO CSRB is a 
$25,000 bonus that does not add any additional service commitment time to the three-
year extension required after accepting SWOCP. Therefore, a SWO who takes both 
monetary based retention incentive bonuses receives a total of $75,000 and they only owe 
a total of three years payback in addition to their original commitment incurred at 
commissioning.  Offers commonly refer to the total bonus allotted as the “SWO 
bonus.”12  
5. Eligibility Requirements 
SWOCP is a special pay.  United States Code-Title 37 Section 319 (37 USC 319) 
authorizes SWOCP for eligible officers who obligate to remain on active duty and 
complete one or more tours of duty during which they may serve as afloat Department 
Heads.13  An eligible Surface Warfare Officer who executes a written agreement may be 
paid an amount not to exceed $50,000 upon the Secretary of the Navy accepting the 
agreement.14  
To be eligible for the SWOCP special pay bonus, an officer must be an officer of 
the Regular Navy or Naval Reserve on active duty who: 
 Is qualified and serving as a Surface Warfare Officer (designation 111X). 
 Has been selected for assignment as a Department Head on a surface vessel 
and offered a contract by PERS 41, in conjunction with a Department Head or 
special screening board. 
                                                 
11 Chief of Naval Operations, Junior Surface Warfare Critical Skills Retention Bonus, Naval Message 
(Washington, DC: CNO, 2006).  
12 Constance M. Denmond, Derek N. Johnson, Chavius G. Lewis and Christopher R. Zegley, 
“Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied to the Selection of Surface Warfare Officer Retention Incentives” 
(MBA professional report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
13 Secretary of the Navy, SECNAVINST 7220.84 Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay, 
Instruction (Washington, DC: SECNAV, 2000). 
14 U.S. Congressional Record - House, H4165 Congressional Record House 14 June 1999, Report 
(Washington, DC: Congress, 1999). 
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 Has completed any service commitment incurred through the officer’s original 
commissioning program. 
 Is able to complete the afloat Department Head tours or a single longer tour as 
assigned by PERS 41. 
 Is designated to fill Department Head sequencing plan billets. 
 Applies prior to graduation from Department Head School (officers will be 
ineligible for SWOCP if they do not apply prior to graduation). 
The FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act established the SWO CSRB to better 
compete for the strengths and talents of Surface Warfare professionals.15  The SWO 
CSRB simply increases the total amount of the SWO bonus.  Conceptually the two 
bonuses are essentially a single bonus, but the payment processes and accounting 
authority cause the two bonuses to remain separate from one another.   
Eligibility for SWO CSRB is very similar to SWOCP requirements: 
 Permanently appointed Lieutenant. 
 Completed two Division Officer tours or a single longer tour. 
 Not completed more than 25 years of active duty. 
 Completed 5 years of military service. 
 Sea duty assignable. 
 Approved for SWOCP 
6. Payment Scheme 
The total SWO retention bonus offered by the Navy is $75,000.  Like most 
military bonuses, the SWO bonus is not paid up front.  Instead, the bonus is paid out over 
almost six years.   
                                                 
15 Chief of Naval Operations, Junior Surface Warfare Critical Skills Retention Bonus, Naval Message 
(Washington, DC: CNO, 2006). 
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The following is a break down of the payment plans for both SWOCP and CSRB: 
 SWOCP:  $10,000 paid upon initial signing.  Once the officer starts 
Department Head School (by the 7 ½ year mark of their career as a 
commissioned officer), they receive the first of four $10,000 payments.  The 
anniversary of their Department Head School start date or first Department 
Head tour report date marks the payment of the three remaining annual 
payments. 
 CSRB:  Officers will receive payments on the anniversary of their year 
commissioned service (YCS) 6, 7, and 8.  The first payment installment is 
$15,000, followed by payments at YCS 7 and 8 of $5,000 each. 
For typical officers who accept the SWO bonuses when they make the rank of 
Lieutenant at their four-year commissioned mark, the following exemplifies their 
payment schedule for both bonuses: 
YCS 4:   $10,000 SWOCP 
YCS 5:   None 
YCS 6:   $15,000 CSRB 
YCS 7:   $15,000 ($10,000 SWOCP+$5,000 CSRB)  
YCS 8:   $15,000 ($10,000 SWOCP+$5,000 CSRB) 
YCS 9:   $10,000 SWOCP 
YCS 10: $10,000 SWOCP  
B. SUMMARY 
Though there are periodic rumors on the seafront, albeit from no known source, of 
an increase in the total SWO bonus, the truth is that it still totals $75,000.  The Navy still 
faces retention issues in meeting Department Head requirements in the Surface Warfare 
community.  Previous research at NPS, conducted by Benjamin Cook and Brooke 
Zimmerman in 2008, suggests incorporating non-monetary retention incentives through a 
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reverse auction mechanism.  Our project uses combinations of monetary and NMIs that 
reduce the Navy’s retention bonus costs while maximizing the SWOs’ self-interest.  We 
will use experiments to examine the behavior patterns of individuals in the decision-
making process when choosing their optimal incentive package. 
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III. RETENTION MECHANISMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
“The most straightforward approach to retention bonuses is to only use monetary 
incentives.”16  However, monetary incentive alone may not always be sufficient to 
achieve desired retention goals, as is the case in the SWO community.  This chapter 
discusses the potential of combining NMIs and monetary incentives to reduce the Navy’s 
costs of monetary incentives while increasing the total value delivered to the individual 
SWO.  
B. MONETARY RETENTION INCENTIVES 
To date, the monetary retention mechanisms discussed in Chapter II are the only 
incentives the Navy applies toward retention in the SWO community.  However, previous 
NPS research conducted by Constance M. Denmond and others in 2007 suggests that a 
monetary bonus is insufficient to address the reasons why junior officers are dissatisfied 
with and choosing to leave the SWO community after completing their initial 
commissioning commitment.17  Additionally, their research found that the current 
financial incentives are not sufficient to entice SWOs to remain in the community; 
perhaps no amount of financial incentive would suffice.18   
C. NON-MONETARY RETENTION INCENTIVES 
As the SWO survey conducted by Denmond et al., made apparent, money is not 
always the driving force for retention.  Some examples of NMIs SWOs value include 
                                                 
16  Peter J. Coughlan, William R. Gates and Brooke M. Zimmerman, “The Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism (CRAM): Integrating Monetary and Non-Monetary Re-Enlistment Incentives.” 
(Technical report, Naval Postgradaute School, forthcoming). 
17  Constance M. Denmond, Derek N. Johnson, Chavius G. Lewis and Christopher R. Zegley, 
“Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied to the Selection of Surface Warfare Officer Retention Incentives” 
(MBA professional report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
18  Constance M. Denmond, Derek N. Johnson, Chavius G. Lewis and Christopher R. Zegley, 
“Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied to the Selection of Surface Warfare Officer Retention Incentives” 
(MBA professional report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
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homeport choice, geographic stability, and sabbatical.  The combination of monetary and 
NMIs can be used to offer SWOs a greater retention incentive value.  This has propelled 
us to investigate the role of NMIs and how they could be used in lieu of and in 
combination with the monetary incentives already offered to the SWO community to 
increase retention.    
1. Cost versus Value 
When exploring NMIs as retention tools, one must be able to differentiate 
between the terms cost and value.  In the experiment conducted for the research 
associated with the project, cost is the true cost to the Navy of the NMI offered; value 
depends on the individual’s evaluation of the NMI offered.   
The goal of the Navy, in terms of NMIs, is for the cost of a NMI to be less than 
the value to the individual choosing the incentive.  “If an individual service member 
values an incentive more than it costs the Navy to provide, then both the Navy and 
individual gain from providing the incentive as part of a retention package.”19  If the 
individual’s value is less than what the incentive costs for the Navy, then neither receives 
satisfaction from the NMI.  The value individuals receive depends on how much the 
incentive is worth to them.  Figure 1 graphically depicts the two scenarios of value 
exceeding cost and of cost exceeding value.       
                                                 
19  Jason Blake Ellis, “Variability of Valuation of Non-Monetary Incentives: Motivating and 




Figure 1.   NMIs:  Cost vs. Value (From Coughlan and Gates, 2007) 
2. Non-monetary Incentive Portfolio 
When developing a combined monetary and NMI portfolio, the optimal Navy 
incentive package would combine incentives that are of high value to the individual, but 
low cost to the government.  If the value of the incentives included in packages offered to 
SWOs outweighs the government’s cost of the incentive package, then it is in the best 
interest of the Navy to offer SWOs those combination incentive packages.  By offering a 
package in which the individual’s value of each incentive exceeds the cost the Navy 
incurs from providing it, then both parties can be better off; it is in the government’s best 
interest to retain the individuals with the incentive packages that reduce costs to the 
government and provide higher total value to the individual.  Conversely, as Figure 2 
illustrates, the Navy would not want to offer incentives in which the cost to the Navy is 




Figure 2.   NMI Portfolio (From Coughlan and Gates, 2007) 
Figure 2 illustrates the concept of cost versus value in a NMI portfolio.  
Theoretically, geographic stability and homeport in this illustration offer individual 
values that exceed the Navy’s cost to provide the incentive for most individuals.  On the 
other hand, telecommuting and sabbatical are perceived to have a higher cost to the Navy 
than value to most individuals.  The lower the cost incurred by the Navy and the higher 
the perceived value of the incentive to the individual, the more benefit that is created by 
the incentive. 
If the Navy were to provide any of these incentives “universally” to all SWOs, 
they would be best served by offering geographic stability and homeport.  However, if 
the Navy offered geographic stability and homeport to all SWOs, some would accept the 
incentive but receive a value that is less than the Navy’s cost; it would not be cost 
effective for the Navy to offer geographic stability and homeport to these SWOs.  At the 
same time, there are some SWOs that value telecommuting and sabbaticals more than it 
costs the Navy’s provide them.  The Navy would omit a cost-effective incentive if it did 
not offer telecommuting and sabbatical to these SWOs. 
To summarize, the Navy is maximizing cost-effectiveness by creating 
individualized incentive packages that offer NMIs to any SWO whose value exceeds the 
Navy’s cost.  The benefit achieved by such individualized incentive packages is the area 
below the value line and above the cost line, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.   Benefit Achieved by Incentives (From Coughlan and Gates, 2007) 
D. SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION TRUTH REVEALING 
In a sealed bid auction, bidders submit bids and but no bids are revealed until the 
winner is announced.  In a second-price auction, the winner of the auction is the highest 
bidder, but the price paid by the winner is the amount bid by the next highest bidder (or 
first excluded bidder if there are multiple winners).  Truth revealing refers to the optimal 
bidding strategy of a second-price sealed bid auction; the optimal strategy in such an 
auction is bidding ones true value.  For further discussion and examples of truth-
revelation in second-price sealed bid auctions, refer to previous research conducted by 
Brooke M. Zimmerman in 2008 from NPS.20 
E. COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM (CRAM) 
The CRAM incorporates three elements—each serves a separate purpose: 
(1) Second Price Auction provides accuracy in setting bonus level; 
                                                 
20  Brook M. Zimmerman, “Integrating Monetary and Non-Monetary Reenlistment Incentives 
Utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2008). 
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(2) Incorporating NMIs reduces the Navy’s cost to retain an individual when that 
individual’s value > cost for that NMI; 
(3) Combinatorial auctions provide individualized incentive packages with no 
“wasted” incentives.21 
In applying CRAM to SWO retention issues, the Navy offers the same NMIs to 
all SWOs.  However, each SWO only receives the NMI if their value of the incentive 
exceeds cost.  The SWO must express a willingness to pay for the incentive that exceeds 
the Navy’s cost to provide the incentive.   
1. Definition 
In the CRAM auction, each SWO bids the minimum monetary incentive required 
if the retention incentive was cash-only.  Additionally, the SWO indicates how much that 
cash bonus could be reduced for each NMI, if that NMI were included in his retention 
package.  After receiving the bids, the auctioneer calculates the minimum cost package 
required to retain each SWO.  Each minimum cost package includes any NMIs where the 
SWOs value exceeds the Navy’s cost.  To calculate the amount of cash bonus the SWO 
receives, the required cash-only bonus is reduced by the SWOs stated value of each NMI 
in the initial bid.  The Navy’s total cost of those incentives is then added to the 
provisional cash bonus to derive the Navy’s total cost of the package bid.  That is: 
Navy Cost=Required cash only bonus–Value of awarded NMIs+Cost of awarded NMIs 
SWOs with the lowest cost to the Navy are retained.  The SWOs retained receive an 
incentive package that includes their NMI package plus a cash bonus that equals the 
Navy’s effective cost for the first excluded bid minus the Navy’s cost of his incentive 
package.22  That is: 
Cash Bonus=Navy Cost of first excluded bid–Navy cost of Sailor’s awarded NMIs 
                                                 
21  Peter J. Coughlan, William R. Gates and Brooke M. Zimmerman, “The Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism (CRAM): Integrating Monetary and Non-Monetary Re-Enlistment Incentives.” 




Figure 4.   Example:  CRAM  (From Coughlan and Gates, 2007) 
Figure 4 explains the retention outcome of three sailors through the use of 
CRAM.  What this example proves is that CRAM lowers the cost of retention for the 
Navy while not sacrificing individual sailor’s value received.  For further explanation of 
CRAM through examples, refer to Appendix A.   
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IV. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
A. BACKGROUND 
The first thing to say about economic experiments is what they are not. Economic 
experiments are not simulations or role-playing exercises. They involve real people who 
must make serious choices. Their decisions in the laboratory are as acute and as poignant 
as those made outside the laboratory. Through their efforts, participants stand to make or 
lose a substantial amount of money.23 
B. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
Academics define economics as the branch of social science that deals with the 
production, distribution and consumption of goods and services and their management.24  
As with all sciences, the field of economics is observable.  Economics is a science filled 
with complicated and naturally occurring systems.  Economists observe market behaviors 
to include human choice behavior, and develop their own theories and models to explain 
how and why various market conditions occur.  Economists base their theories on 
statistical data compiled from what they call “natural” markets.  In turn, they develop 
their models to test their theories as predictors for future market conditions and individual 
choice behavior.  The problem with basing theories on “natural” markets alone is that the 
data “often fail to allow ‘critical tests’ of theoretical propositions, because distinguishing 
historical circumstances occur only by change.25”  By running controlled laboratory 
experiments, economists are able to see if their theories match observed individual 
human behavior. 
                                                 
23  Don Coursey, Vernon Smith, Economic Experiments, and the Visible Hand, October  28, 2002, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/CourseyVSmith.html (accessed October 15, 2009). 
24  Princeton, Word Net Search, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=economics (accessed 
October 15, 2009). 
25  Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt, Experimental Economics (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1993). 
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By running experiments under controlled laboratory conditions, economists 
overcome the problem of naturally occurring data.  The benefits to running economic 
experiments are that they “can be an inexpensive way to study or explain behavior, 
examine certain economic policies, evaluate performance in institutions, and design 
better economic incentives.26”  Experiments show human behavior in market conditions 
when past data alone cannot be used as a predicator or when market situations are too 
complicated to be revealed by natural markets. 
C. TYPES OF EXPERIMENTS 
There are several examples of economic experiments that economists use in their 
research methods.  The three main types of economic experiments are individual decision 
theory experiments, game theory experiments, and price theory experiments.   While 
there is some overlap between the three categories, each presents its own distinct purpose 
to economic experiments.   
1. Price Theory Experiments 
The supply and demand curve model is the most basic model used by economists 
to teach others how markets work.  The supply and demand model illustrates how prices 
are determined in different types of markets. In a price theory experiment, sometimes 
revered to as a market theory experiment, price and quantity predictions are determined 
by where the supply curve meets the demand curve.   
                                                 
26  Willian J. Norton, “Using an Experimental Apporach to Improving the Selective Reenlistment 
Bonus Program” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
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Figure 5.   Supply and Demand Curves  (From Norton, 2007) 
The following illustrates a price theory experiment conducted by Vernon L Smith, 
an economist at Chapman University.  First, Smith started off with a simple price theory 
experiment titled a two-person exchange that involves a single buyer and a single seller.  
In the experiment, the two come to an agreement, or not, on the price of an object.  The 
professor assigns the cost and value, represented by a card given to the buyer and the 
seller.  For example, the seller is given a card specifying that the cost of production for 
the object is, say, $5.  Any price the seller receives above $5 will result in profit.  The 
Buyer similarly receives a card stating that the resale value of the object is, say, $15.  In 
this situation, one of two outcomes will occur, either the seller and buyer will come to an 
agreement between $5 and $15 or they will not reach an agreement and a transaction will 
not occur.27 
The simple experiment between two individuals can be expanded for more 
complex market situations.  Suppose instead there are five buyers and five sellers and 
each is given a card with different costs and values.  Smith conducted these experiments 
using a “double-oral-auction.”  This auction makes buyer and sellers publicly declare 
                                                 
27  Don Coursey, Vernon Smith, Economic Experiments, and the Visible Hand, October 28, 2002, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/CourseyVSmith.html (accessed October 15, 2009). 
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their bids.  Smith used an important rule, called the bid-asked-price-reduction-rule 
meaning that sellers called and publicly posted asking prices.28  All announced asking 
prices must descend from the original asking price.  The buyers had to do the same, 
though bids must ascend from the starting bid price.  Trade occurs in two ways, either a 
seller accepts any buyer’s bid or a buyer accepts any seller’s asking price.   The 
experimental results showed that the price always reached equilibrium where the demand 
curve met the supply curve.29 
2. Game Theory Experiments 
Game theory describes a class of mathematical models describing the interaction 
of rational agents.30  Game theory experiments deal with individuals and the choices they 
make.  The rules for the game are set and the success of the individual depends on their 
choices and the choices of others.  The best example to explain game theory experiments 
is the prisoner’s dilemma. 
Suppose two individuals, Mike and John, have committed a serious crime, but 
were arrested for a lesser offense.  Police officers take the two criminals to different 
rooms and interrogate them.  The police have enough evidence to convict the criminals 
on the lesser offense, but not the serious crime.  The cops give each of them the same 
deal, implicate the other in the serious crime and they will receive a reduced sentence.  If 
Mike confesses to the serious crime and John does not, Mike will get no sentence and 
John will receive a ten-year sentence.  The opposite is true if John confesses and Mike 
does not.  If they both confess they will each get six-year sentences.  If neither of them 
confesses, they will each get two years. 
                                                 
28  Don Coursey, Vernon Smith, Economic Experiments, and the Visible Hand, OCT 28, 2002, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/CourseyVSmith.html (accessed October 15, 2009). 
29  Ibid. 




Figure 6.   Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Mike wants to make the best deal for himself, but he is unsure of what John will 
do.  Clearly, both prisoners will be better off if neither of them confesses, each serving 
only two-years in prison.  Since neither player knows what the other will do, hence the 
dilemma, the best or dominant strategy is to confess.  A dominant strategy is a strategy 
that is best for a player regardless of the other players’ strategy.31  In this case, if John 
confesses, Mike should confess too because his sentence will be six years instead of ten.  
If John does not confess, Mike’s best option is to still confess because he will serve no 
time instead of two years.  A prisoner’s dilemma pricing problem can be used to describe 
oligopoly market situations or cases with few competing firms. 
3. Individual Decision Theory Experiments 
Decision theory is a branch of statistical theory concerned with quantifying the 
process of choosing between alternatives.32  Decision theory focuses on individuals 
indentifying the best decision to make when presented with a list of choices containing 
                                                 
31  Robert E. Hall and Marc Lieberman, Economics: Principles and Applications, 4 (Mason, OH: 
Thomson Higher Education, 2008). 
32  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/decision%20theory (accessed October 15, 2009). 
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uncertainty.  These choices lead to an expected value that the individual tries to 
maximize, but not all individuals act the same.  There are two types of individuals, 
adverse and risk neutral individuals.  Risk adverse individuals will take a lower expected 
value for less risk.  Risk neutral individuals are only concerned with gaining the highest 
expected value, regardless of the risk involved.   
An example of this can involve a person given two scenarios.  One scenario has a 
guaranteed payoff, say $10.  The other scenario involves flipping a coin for a payoff.  If 
the coin lands on tails, the individual receives $25.  If the coin lands on heads, the 
individual receives nothing.  An individual would receive $10 guaranteed from the first 
scenario and an expected value of $15.50, $25 x .5 + $0 x .5 = $12.50, for the coin 
flipping scenario.  A risk adverse individual might take the guaranteed $10 payment 
because it contains no risk; a risk neutral individual would try to maximize his returns 
and take the coin flip with an expected value of $12.50. 
Individual decision theory is important to the Department of Defense because it 
deals with individual behavior when faced with uncertainty.  The theory helps to analyze 
situations when looking at expected value, such as the individuals’ risk traits in choosing 
between being retained by the armed services and venturing into the private sector; or 
questions such how military members will respond in retention auctions when faced with 
uncertainty regarding others bidding strategies. 
D. DESIGNING EXPERIMENTS 
When conducting experiments in a laboratory, there are advantages and 
limitations.  The two main advantages in conducting laboratory experiments are 
replicablity and control.  Replication improves experimental results by allowing several 
groups to partake in the experiment.  Replication reduces variability in experimental 
results and increases the significance and confidence levels with which a researcher can 
draw conclusions about an experimental treatment.33  Control is the ability to manipulate 
laboratory conditions so that observed behavior can be used to evaluate alternative 
                                                 
33  Experimentation Definitions, http://www.stat.yale.edu/Courses/1997-98/101/expdes.htm (accessed 
October 15, 2009). 
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theories and policies.34  Properly controlling variables and the testing environment 
eliminates inaccuracies and misconceptions that could result if there was no control. 
Conversely, experiments do have limitations.  The most common limitation in 
running experiments is that they fail to develop an alternative hypothesis when evaluating 
a primary hypothesis.  An experiment can only prove or disprove a primary hypothesis or 
theory.  If a theory is proven wrong by an experiment, a new theory must be formulated 
and a new experiment administered.   
E. SUMMARY 
Economists typically use experiments to gather information to verify theories they 
can then use to build models.  Economists use experiments and models to explain how 
and why various decisions are made and examine the resulting impacts.  While there are 
some disadvantages to running experiments, there are a significant number of advantages.   
                                                 
34  Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt, Experimental Economics (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1993). 
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V. ADMINISTRATION OF SECOND-PRICE SEALED BID 
EXPERIMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
LT Amanda Browning and LT Clinton Burr ran a pilot experiment on two NPS 
economics classes in November 2009 using a second-price sealed bid auction.  The 
experiment format consisted of two stages.  The first stage was an experiment with cash 
bids only.  The second stage of the experiment involved a cash bid plus bids for NMIs.  
This chapter details the experimental procedures.  The entire experiment is provided in 
Appendices B-D. 
B. EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW 
The goal of the experiment was to determine if subjects bid their true value for 
monetary and non-monetary incentives.  The experiment design placed subjects in a 
hypothetical salary survey and then added in a non-monetary compensation salary option.  
The experimenters ran the experiment on two sets of subjects.  Both sets of subjects 
participating in the experiment involved 19 students.  The experiment was a paper 
experiment in which the experimenters set the pace by reading all instructions aloud and 
instructing when to commence each phase.  Appendix B is the actual experiment received 
by the subjects.  Appendices C and D are the experiment instructions and visual 
examples.  After each round of salary bid submission, experimenters calculated and 
showed the results to the subjects.  After compiling the data, the experimenters debriefed 
the subjects on the results.  
1. Initial Cash Bid Only 
In the initial cash bid only experiment scenario, there were two firms in which the 
subjects could work, Firm A or Firm B.  Firm A is downsizing by 50% (ten employees).  
The only other employer to the subject is Firm B.  Subjects have no preference between 
working for either Firm A or Firm B.  The subject’s only goal is to maximize their 
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income.  If Firm A does not retain the subject, they will begin to work for Firm B 
immediately.  Firm B presents a confidential salary offer to Firm A employees.  Subjects 
know from the instructions that the offers from Firm B are spread evenly and randomly 
between some range and that their offer is somewhere within that range.  The subjects 
then submitted a salary bid to Firm A.  Their salary bid is the minimum annual salary 
necessary to remain at Firm A.  Based on the salary submissions, Firm A then retains the 
ten employees with the lowest salary bids while those not retained are immediately laid 
off and begin working for Firm B.  Those retained at Firm A all receive the same annual 
salary equal to the lowest salary of the 50% of employees laid off (i.e., the first excluded 
bid).  Those employees laid off immediately begin working for Firm B at the salary Firm 
B offered to them.   
2. Cash Bid Plus NMIs 
In the cash bid plus NMIs experiment scenario, there are still two firms in which 
the subjects could work, Firm A or Firm B.  In this scenario, everything is the same 
except that now Firm A offers two NMIs that Firm B does not offer.  Firm A asks all of 
its employees to specify the minimum annual salary they require to remain with Firm A.  
Then, Firm A asks how much the subjects would be willing to give up from that salary 
for each NMI.  The subjects only receive the NMI if their bid for the NMI is greater than 
Firm A’s cost of the NMI.  Firm A will retain 50% of the subjects.  The employees laid 
off immediately begin working at Firm B at the salary offered.  The remaining employees 
continue to work for Firm A and receive those NMIs where their bid was greater than the 
NMI cost to Firm A.  Those employees retained by Firm A received a salary equal to the 
base salary minus the cost of any NMIs they received.  The base salary is the lowest 
salary of the 50% of employees laid off.    
C. RESULTS 
During the actual experiment and for the ease of computation while in the 
classroom, if a tie occurred, Firm A retained both subjects and the next highest bid was 
the salary paid.  However, for the sake of analyzing the data, the experimenters used a 
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random tiebreaker to determine who won the tie and only retained ten subjects in every 
round (ensuring the same retention rates across all trials).  The experimenters 
independently analyzed the data from both sets of experiments, referred to as Experiment 
1 and Experiment 2.  
 
Figure 7.   Salary at Firm A, Experiment 1 
 
Figure 8.   Salary at Firm A, Experiment 2 
Figures 7 and 8 show the results for the cash bid only portion of the salary survey.  
The bidded line represents the average dollar amount each subject bid during each round 
of the experiment.  The true value line shows the average salary offered by Firm B to 
each subject during each round of bidding.  Figure 7 round 8 shows that the subjects tried 
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to game the survey and bid low to ensure retention by Firm A, but they could have 
received a higher average salary if they bid their true value for retention.   
Figures 21 to 28 are located in Appendix E and show how close to true value each 
subject bid for each experiment during the first, second, ninth, and tenth round of the 
experiment.  The line bisecting the graph is the equilibrium line, or the true value for each 
round of bidding.  The closer to the line, the closer the subjects bid to their true value.  If 
the data point is below or above the line, the subject bid that amount different than their 
true value.  By showing the first, second, ninth, and then tenth rounds, we show that with 
the exception of a few outliers per experimental group, learning occurred as subjects 
began to bid closer to their true value.  
 
Figure 9.   Difference Between Bid and Offer, Experiment 1 
 
Figure 10.   Difference Between Bid and Offer, Experiment 2 
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Figures 9 and 10 also show that learning occurred.  They illustrate the difference 
between what the subjects bid and the salary Firm A offered, shown as an average 
percentage for each round of bidding.  A value of 1.000 indicates that the average of the 
bids were at true value.  If the round is above 1.0000, the rounds average bids were above 
the true value; if below 1.000, the opposite is true.  Figure 9 shows that the first class 
taking the experiment definitely learned occurred because the average approaches 1.0000 
over the course of ten rounds.  Although Figure 10 does not show a line approaching 
1.0000, we think this could reflect that two subjects in the second experiment group 
continuously tried to game the system by bidding $1 and $0.   
 
Figure 11.   Total Cost Difference, Experiment 1 
 
Figure 12.   Total Cost Difference, Experiment 2 
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Figures 11 and 12 show the difference in the total average cost per round between 
the bidded value and the value if the subjects bid their true value.  The blue line 
represents the total salary paid per round based on the subject bids.  The red line 
represents the total salary that would have been paid if all subjects bid their true value.  
Figures 11 and 12 prove that the optimal strategy is to bid ones true value because the 
subject does as well or better, but never worse, if they bid their true value for each round 
of bidding. 
 
Figure 13.   Cost vs. Value to Firm A, Experiment 1 
 
Figure 14.   Cost vs.Value to Firm A, Experiment 2 
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Figures 13 and 14 are from data obtained through the cash bid plus NMI portion 
of the experiment.  The graph illustrates the differences in costs and value for each round 
if each subject bid truthfully.  In each round, it is less expensive or of equal cost to Firm 
A to offer NMIs; value to the bidders increases significantly in all but one round (round 
4, experiment 2).  In that round, offering NMIs reduced the firm’s retention costs enough 
that the bidders’ received a slightly lower value. 
D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis was to use an experimental approach to examine the 
decisions making process SWOs might use when choosing between monetary and non-
monetary retention bonuses.  We expected to observe that experimental subjects would 
choose incentives that maximize their personal retention value by combining monetary 
and non-monetary incentives.  The goal was to help create a mechanism that combines 
monetary and non-monetary incentives that reduce retention bonus cost to the Navy while 
maximizing individual self-value.   
During our experiment, we found that value was always greater than cost when 
incentives were provided correctly.  When an individual placed more value on a non-
monetary incentive than the cost of that incentive, cost to be retained decreased.  Also, 
when compared to cash alone, the cost to retain became lower when providing non-
monetary incentives.  Referring to Figures 13 and 14 from the previous chapter, cost to 
retain was always higher than the cost of just monetary incentives.  Non-monetary 
incentives help drive down cost when an individual values the service more than the cost.  
The company retaining individuals, Firm A, absorbs the benefit of the difference between 
cost and value with no harm to the individual. 
In our experiment, when non-monetary incentives were applied, value for Firm A 
employees was greater than cash alone 80% of the time.  While this experiment was just 
a pilot, we conclude that adding non-monetary incentives creates more value to 
individuals than cash alone while also reducing the cost to retain employees. 
The experiment met our goal of helping to form a retention mechanism that 
creates the same or greater value to individuals at a lower cost to the Navy.  While the 
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experiment was a pilot, it proves that when individuals value a non-monetary incentive 
more than the cost to provide that incentive, both the Navy and the individual are better 
off. 
1. Recommendations 
During the experiment, we noted several improvements to create a more efficient 
experiment environment to produce better data.  One improvement will come from 
designing the experiment using a computer application and then administrating it on a 
computer.  This will save a significant amount of time in that paper bids will not have to 
be collected and counted.  Individuals will not have to sit and wait while they are notified 
if they are retained or not.  Information would flow much faster using a computer-based 
system. 
Another improvement can be larger values for non-monetary incentives and larger 
salaries.  Having larger amounts for non-monetary incentives will help show the impact 
they create in graphs and statistical data.  This in turn might help observers see the 
strength in cost savings when analyzing the data from an experiment. 
Additionally, the instructions and examples (provided in Appendix C and D) were 
inefficient for explaining the experiment.  Even though it appears that learning did occur 
over the course of the experiment, the authors recommend further research to ease the 
confusion of the model and to make implementation of the model more accurate and 
possible on a large scale.  Though this paper focused primarily on the issues surrounding 
SWO retention, the CRAM model, if implemented properly and with accurate cost data, 
could help discover the optimal incentive package for retention of a larger, more diverse 
sample of military fields. 
2. Further Research 
We recommend further research into CRAM experiments, focusing on value 
creation through non-monetary incentives.  Computer based experiments would greatly 
enhance the speed and substance of the experiments.  Also, we recommend running 
experiments stating what the non-monetary incentives are (homeporting, type of ship, 
 37
etc.) as well as disclosing the cost of the non-monetary incentive before submitting bids.  
Lastly, we recommend running experiments with a menu type options were individuals 
can choose what non-monetary incentives they would like from a group, thus seeing 
behavioral actions when able to fully customize retention package.   
 38
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 39
APPENDIX A:  COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION 
MECHANISM (CRAM) 
A. OVERVIEW  
The CRAM incorporates three elements—each serves a separate purpose: 
(1) Second Price Auction provides accuracy in setting bonus level; 
(2) A NMI reduce the Navy’s cost to retain a Sailor when that Sailor’s value > 
cost for that NMI; 
(3) Combinatorial auctions provide individualized incentive packages with no 
“wasted” incentives.35 
Under the CRAM, a retained Sailor receives a particular NMI only if he expresses 
a willingness to pay for the incentive that exceeds the Navy’s cost to provide the 
incentive.  This eliminates the need to determine which incentives to offer; all incentives 
are offered to all Sailors and allocated to those whose value exceeds cost.  For those 
NMIs whose cost varies significantly depending on the number of participants, there are a 
number of variations of the CRAM which can be adopted to accommodate varying 
(presumably increasing) unit costs.  This includes using equilibrium prices (where the 
supply or marginal cost curve intersects the demand or value curve), average costs or 
quantity limits (quotas) for each NMI (these options will not be discussed in detail here). 
B. PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
The CRAM Auction is very similar to the auctions used for monetary retention 
and the Universal Incentive Package described above.  Each Sailor bids the minimum 
selective re-enlistment bonus (SRB) he would require if the retention incentive were 
cash-only.  Each Sailor also indicates how much his cash bonus could be reduced for 
each NMI if that NMI were included in his retention package. 
                                                 
35 Peter J. Coughlan, email message to the author, November 2, 2008. 
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After receiving these bids, the auctioneer calculates the minimum cost package 
required to retain each Sailor.  Each minimum cost package includes any NMI where the 
Sailor’s value exceeds the Navy’s cost.  To calculate the Sailor’s provisional cash bonus, 
the Sailor’s required cash-only bonus is reduced by the NMI value stated in the initial bid 
for any NMI offered that Sailor.  The Navy’s total cost of those incentives is then added 
to the provisional cash bonus to derive the Sailor’s “effective” cost to the Navy—or the 
Navy’s total cost of the package bid. 
After calculating each Sailor’s minimum cost retention package, lowest cost 
Sailors are retained.  Each retained Sailor receives their individualized NMI package plus 
a cash bonus that equals the Navy’s effective cost for the first excluded bid minus the 
Navy’s cost of his incentive package.  Note that the Navy’s total retention cost is the 
same for every retained Sailor.  Each Sailor receives a personalized NMI package and 
values the incentives differently, so the value of the retention incentive varies across 
Sailors.  The value each Sailor receives from their retention package equals or exceeds 
the Navy’s retention cost; in many cases a Sailor’s value significantly exceeds the Navy’s 
cost.36  Furthermore, the value for each retained Sailor’s retention package exceeds their 
cash-only bonus requirement. 
C. PROCESS EXAMPLE 
In the example illustrated by Figure 15, three Sailors truthfully bid their minimum 
required cash-only SRB, given that this is a generalized second-price auction, and each 
states the dollar amount of that bonus he would sacrifice for each of the 2 available 
NMIs; each NMIs is assumed to cost the Navy $20,000 per Sailor.  Each Sailor’s 
minimum cost bid package includes any NMI for which his value exceeds cost.  Given 
the values shown in Figure 15, Sailor 1’s bid package would include incentive 1; Sailor 
2’s bid package would include incentive 2; and Sailor 3’s bid package would include both 
incentives.  The auctioneer then calculates a revised minimum cash retention bonus.  This 
is the original cash bonus bid minus the sum of the stated values for each NMI included 
                                                 
36 Peter J. Coughlan and William Gates, “Monetary and Non-Monetary SWO Retention Bonuses:  The 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, May 6, 2007). 
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in the bid package.  Each Sailor’s minimum cost to retain is then this revised minimum 
cash bonus plus the total cost of any NMIs included in the bid package. 
   
 
Figure 15.   Enlisted Retention Example:  CRAM  (From Coughlan and Gates, 2007) 
As shown, if the Navy plans to retain two of these three Sailors, Sailors 1 and 3 
would be retained as they have the two lowest retention costs.  Each of the retained 
Sailors would receive the NMIs included in their bid package; each also receives a cash 
bonus equal to the total “effective” cost of the first excluded bid ($80,000 in the example) 
minus the Navy’s total cost of the NMIs included in that package. 
D. THE ADVANTAGE OF CRAM 
The example in Figure 15 illustrates the money-saving potential of the CRAM 
Auction.  Under a second-price retention auction with monetary incentives alone, Sailors 
1 and 2 would be retained for a cash bonus equal to the first excluded cash bid; the 
$100,000 bid submitted by Sailor 3.  Thus, the total cost to retain two Sailors under a 
cash bonus is $200,000.  Under the CRAM, Sailors 1 and 3 would each be retained at a 
cost equal to the total cost of the first excluded package bid.  This cost is the Navy’s 
$80,000 effective cost associated with Sailor 2’s minimum cost package bid.  Thus, the 
total cost to retain two Sailors under CRAM is $160,000. 
Compared to the purely cash retention auction, CRAM retains the same number 
of Sailors but reduces the total cost to the Navy.  In addition, CRAM potentially increases 
the Sailors’ surplus.  The mechanism substitutes cash SRB payments with individualized 
NMI packages when individuals state a willingness to pay that is no less than the Navy’s  
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cost, but the Sailors cash bonus is only reduced by the Navy’s NMI cost.  As a result, 
each Sailor’s surplus equals or exceeds their surplus under the cash only auction, but at a 
lower cost to the Navy:  a true win-win situation. 
Compared to the Universal Incentive Package (UIP), CRAM increases efficiency 
by enabling the Navy to capture the surplus represented by the green triangles in Figure 
16, but eliminating the Navy’s potential waste associated with the red triangles under the 
UIP.  CRAM further increases efficiency by capturing the surplus from incentives not 
offered under the UIP, as represented by the blue triangles in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.   CRAM overcomes the Universal Package Weakness  
(From Coughlan and Gates, 2007) 
Further, CRAM eliminates the difficulties involved in identifying the optimal 
UIP:  truthful revelation of the NMI values, identifying the relevant (retained) population 
of Sailors, and predicting the actual NMI usage rate.  Finally, CRAM potentially changes 
the “mix” of Sailors retained.  In the example above, Sailors 1 and 2 were retained under 
a strictly monetary retention auction; Sailors 1 and 3 were retained under CRAM.   
 43
APPENDIX B:  EXPERIMENT 
A. SURVEY–CASH BID  
EMPLOYEE ID:__________ 
SCENARIO BACKGROUND 
You are an employee of Firm A.  The other students in the classroom are also 
employees of Firm A.  There are no other employees in Firm A besides the students in 
the classroom. 
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference between working for Firm A or for Firm B. 
You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you. 
Your only goal is to maximize your total income. 
DOWNSIZING AT FIRM A 
Firm A is downsizing.  50% of Firm A’s workforce will be laid off immediately. 
EMPLOYMENT OFFER FROM FIRM B 
Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A.  If you leave Firm A 
now, you will work for Firm B immediately. 
This standing offer of employment at Firm B applies whether you leave Firm A 
voluntarily or if you are laid off. 
SALARY OFFER FROM FIRM B 
Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each employee 
currently working for Firm A.  
The offer presented to each employee (each student in the classroom) represents 
the annual salary that he/she will receive if employed by Firm B. 
Firm B has offered a different annual salary amount to each Firm A employee. 
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DISTRIBUTION OF SALARY OFFERS FROM FIRM B 
You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to other current 
employees at Firm A.  You know only that all of Firm B’s salary offers are spread evenly 
and randomly over some range between some lower bound and some upper bound.  You 
do not know the actual lower and upper bounds of the range of salaries offered.  
However, you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B lies somewhere within 
this range of offers. 
SALARY SURVEY AT FIRM A 
The salary paid to any Firm A employee in previous years will have no influence 
on his/her future salary at Firm A.  Instead, the annual salary that Firm A will pay to each 
of its retained employees will be determined using a survey. 
Firm A is asking all its employees (all students in the classroom) to specify the 
minimum annual salary that he/she would need to receive in order to remain with Firm A.  
Firm A will then pay the minimum salary necessary to voluntarily retain 50% of its 
employees.  In particular, after collecting all “salary requests” from its employees, Firm 
A will lay off the 50% of employees who submitted the highest salary requests. 
The employees laid off (50% of current Firm A employees) will immediately 
begin working at Firm B at the salary offered.  The remaining employees will continue to 
work for Firm A. 
All employees retained by Firm A will be paid the same salary, regardless of the 
salary they requested.  These retained employees will be paid the lowest salary from the 
50% of employees laid off. 
Note that this salary will be higher than the salary requested by any of the retained 
employees. 
YOUR SALARY REQUEST TO FIRM A 
You must now decide what annual salary to request from Firm A. 
Remember that if your request is among the highest 50% of the salary requests 
submitted, you will be laid off from Firm A and will immediately work for Firm B. 
 45
If your salary request to Firm A is not among the highest 50%, you will continue 
to work for Firm A and will receive an annual salary equal to the lowest salary requested 
from the 50% of employees not retained. 
SALARY OFFERS FROM FIRM B 
Under each of the post-it notes below, you will find a salary offer from Firm B.  
The number on each post-it note represents each round of bidding.  You cannot share 
with other employees your offer from Firm B.   
Salary Offer from Firm B    Salary Offer from Firm B 
 
 
_____________________    _____________________ 
 
Salary Offer from Firm B    Salary Offer from Firm B 
 
 
_____________________    _____________________ 
 
Salary Offer from Firm B    Salary Offer from Firm B 
 
 
_____________________    _____________________ 
 
Salary Offer from Firm B    Salary Offer from Firm B 
 
_____________________    _____________________ 
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Salary Offer from Firm B    Salary Offer from Firm B 
 
 
_____________________    _____________________ 
B. SURVEY–CASH BID PLUS NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES  
EMPLOYEE ID:__________ 
SCENARIO BACKGROUND 
You are an employee of Firm A.  The other students in the classroom are also 
employees of Firm A.  There are no other employees in Firm A besides the students in 
the classroom. 
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference between working for Firm A or for Firm B. 
You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you. 
Your only goal is to maximize your total income (monetary and non-monetary 
benefits/income) 
DOWNSIZING AT FIRM A 
Firm A is downsizing.  50% of Firm A’s workforce will be laid off immediately. 
EMPLOYMENT OFFER FROM FIRM B 
Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A.  If you leave Firm A 
now, you will work for Firm B immediately. 
This standing offer of employment at Firm B applies whether you leave Firm A 
voluntarily or if you are laid off. 
SALARY OFFER FROM FIRM B 
Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each employee 
currently working for Firm A.  
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The offer presented to each employee (each student in the classroom) represents 
the annual salary that he/she will receive if employed by Firm B. 
Firm B has offered a different annual salary amount to each Firm A employee. 
DISTRIBUTION OF SALARY OFFERS FROM FIRM B 
You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to other current 
employees at Firm A.  You know only that all of Firm B’s salary offers are spread evenly 
and randomly over some range between some lower bound and some upper bound.  You 
do not know the actual lower and upper bounds of the range of salary offered.  However, 
you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B lies somewhere within this range of 
offers. 
NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES AT FIRM A 
Firm A now offers two non-monetary incentives that Firm B does not offer. 
You do no know the cost of these non-monetary incentives; you only know how 
you value each non-monetary incentive.  
SALARY SURVEY AT FIRM A 
The salary paid to any Firm A employee in previous years will have no influence 
on his/her future salary at Firm A.  Instead, the annual salary that Firm A will pay to each 
of its retained employees will be determined using a survey. 
Firm A is asking all its employees (all students in the classroom) to specify the 
minimum annual salary that he/she would need to receive in order to remain with Firm A.  
Once you determine your minimum annual salary to be retained, Firm A is then asking 
how much you would give up from that salary for each non-monetary incentive.  You 
will only receive a non-monetary incentive if your bid for the non-monetary incentive is 
greater than the cost to Firm A.   
Firm A will then pay the minimum salary necessary to voluntarily retain 50% of 
its employees.  In particular, after collecting all “salary requests” from its employees, 
Firm A will lay off the 50% of employees who submitted the highest salary requests. 
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The employees laid off (50% of current Firm A employees) will immediately 
begin working at Firm B at the salary offered.  The remaining employees will continue to 
work for Firm A and receive those non-monetary incentives where their bid is greater 
than the non-monetary incentive cost to Firm A.   
All employees retained by Firm A will be paid a base salary minus the cost of any 
non-monetary incentives they will receive.  The base salary will be the lowest salary from 
the 50% of employees laid off. 
Note that this salary will be higher than the salary requested by any of the retained 
employees. 
YOUR SALARY REQUEST TO FIRM A 
You must now decide what annual salary to request from Firm A. 
Your overall salary request to Firm A will be an initial salary, minus your bid for 
each NMI you receive where your bid is greater than cost to Firm A.  Firm A will then 
calculate your cost to retain and use that as your competitive bid.  
Remember that if your request is among the highest 50% of the salary requests 
submitted, you will be laid off from Firm A and will immediately work for Firm B. 
If your salary request to Firm A is not among the highest 50%, you will continue 
to work for Firm A and will receive an annual base salary equal to the lowest salary 
requested from the 50% of employees not retained, plus any non-monetary incentives 
where your bid was greater than the cost.  Actual cash salary will be the base salary 
minus the cost of any non-monetary incentives received. 
SALARY OFFERS FROM FIRM B 
Under each of the post-it notes below, you will find a salary offer from Firm B.  
The number on each post-it note represents each round of bidding.  You cannot share 
with other employees your offer from Firm B.   
NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES AT FIRM A 
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Also under each of the post-it notes below, you will find your value for each non-
monetary incentive.  This figure represents your value for each individual non-monetary 
incentive. 
Salary Offer from Firm B    Salary Offer from Firm B 
 
 
_____________________    _____________________ 
NMI #1 Value_________    NMI #1 Value_________ 
NMI#2 Value__________    NMI #2 Value_________ 
Salary Offer from Firm B    Salary Offer from Firm B 
 
 
_____________________    _____________________ 
NMI #1 Value_________    NMI #1 Value_________ 
NMI#2 Value__________    NMI #2 Value_________ 
Salary Offer from Firm B    Salary Offer from Firm B 
 
 
_____________________    _____________________ 
NMI #1 Value_________    NMI #1 Value_________ 





Salary Offer from Firm B    Salary Offer from Firm B 
 
 
_____________________    _____________________ 
NMI #1 Value_________    NMI #1 Value_________ 
NMI#2 Value__________    NMI #2 Value_________ 
Salary Offer from Firm B    Salary Offer from Firm B 
 
 
_____________________    _____________________ 
NMI #1 Value_________    NMI #1 Value_________ 





APPENDIX C:  EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
A. CASH BID 
Welcome. Please do not touch anything in front of you until you are instructed to 
do so.  In front of you, there is a white piece of paper entitled “Experiment Participant 
Registration Information.”  Please take a few minutes to fill in the requested information.  
 You are about to participate in an experiment in labor market decision-making.  
The entire experiment will take place in the classroom and your primary actions will 
involve submitting salary bids on separate pieces of paper.  It is important that you do not 
talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the experiment. 
During the instruction period, you will be given a complete description of the 
experiment and you will be introduced to the type of decisions you will be asked to make 
during the experiment.  If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your 
hand and your question will be answered so that everyone can hear.  If any difficulties 
arise after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and 
assist you. 
The experiment itself will consist of 20 rounds.  Rounds 1 through 10 will involve 
submitting salary bids involving monetary incentives.  Rounds 11 through 20 will involve 
submitting salary bids involving monetary and non-monetary incentives.  Instructions 
will be given for the first 10 rounds and then we will administer those 10 rounds of the 
experiment.  Next, we will pass out what is needed for the second portion of the 
experiment.  Then you will be given the instructions for the next 10 rounds and then we 
will administer rounds 11 through 20 of the experiment. 
You should have three stacks of papers in front of you, a yellow stack, a blue 
sheet, and a stack of green sheets.  Please turn your attention to the yellow sheets, which 
should say “Survey Cash Bid” at the top left hand side of the paper. As you can see, this 
paper contains an extensive description of the labor market scenario we are investigating 
in this experiment.  I will read aloud all of the information that is written on your paper 
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and you should read along.  Also note an employee ID at the top right of this paper.  This 
will be your identification code throughout the remainder of the experiment. 
You can use the yellow papers as a reference if you need it at anytime during the 
first 10 rounds. The first 10 rounds will have all the same information and scenario.  It is 
simply provided as a reference in case you would like to go back and review the scenario 
description. 
I will now begin reading the description on your yellow paper. 
SCENARIO BACKGROUND 
You are an employee of Firm A.  The other students in the classroom are also 
employees of Firm A.  There are no other employees in Firm A besides the students in 
the classroom. 
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference between working for Firm A or for Firm B. 
You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you. 
Your only goal is to maximize your total income. 
DOWNSIZING AT FIRM A 
Firm A is downsizing.  50% of Firm A’s workforce will be laid off immediately. 
EMPLOYMENT OFFER FROM FIRM B 
Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A.  If you leave Firm A 
now, you will work for Firm B immediately. 
This standing offer of employment at Firm B applies whether you leave Firm A 
voluntarily or if you are laid off. 
SALARY OFFER FROM FIRM B 
Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each employee 
currently working for Firm A.  
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The offer presented to each employee (each student in the classroom) represents 
the annual salary that he/she will receive if employed by Firm B. 
Firm B has offered a different annual salary amount to each Firm A employee. 
This is not written on your yellow sheets of paper, but if you turn to the last page, 
you will find 10 post-it notes, each having a number written on it.  Do not remove any 
post-it notes until I instruct you to do so.  The number on the post-it note corresponds to 
the round of bidding taking place, 1 for round 1, 2 for round 2, etc.  For each round, you 
will remove the post-it note for that round and that will be your salary offer from Firm B.  
Please do not remove any post-it notes for future rounds.  Also, past rounds have no 
effect on the current round of bidding.  Once a round is over, the last round salary offer 
has no consequence on future rounds of bidding.   
Now, I will now continue reading the experiment.  
DISTRIBUTION OF SALARY OFFERS FROM FIRM B 
You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to other current 
employees at Firm A.  You know only that all of Firm B’s salary offers are spread evenly 
and randomly over some range between some lower bound and some upper bound.  You 
do not know the actual lower and upper bounds of the range of salaries offered.  
However, you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B lies somewhere within 
this range of offers. 
SALARY SURVEY AT FIRM A 
The salary paid to any Firm A employee in previous years will have no influence 
on his/her future salary at Firm A.  Instead, the annual salary that Firm A will pay to each 
of its retained employees will be determined using a survey. 
Firm A is asking all its employees (all students in the classroom) to specify the 
minimum annual salary that he/she would need to receive in order to remain with Firm A.  
Firm A will then pay the minimum salary necessary to voluntarily retain 50% of its 
employees.  In particular, after collecting all “salary requests” from its employees, Firm 
A will lay off the 50% of employees who submitted the highest salary requests. 
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The employees laid off (50% of current Firm A employees) will immediately 
begin working at Firm B at the salary offered.  The remaining employees will continue to 
work for Firm A. 
All employees retained by Firm A will be paid the same salary, regardless of the 
salary they requested.  These retained employees will be paid the lowest salary from the 
50% of employees laid off. 
Note that this salary will be higher than the salary requested by any of the retained 
employees. 
Now, my partner will further explain the salary survey.  (Appendix D includes the 
PowerPoint slides used for the experiment explanations.)  
Now we will continue reading the instructions on the yellow sheet of paper. 
YOUR SALARY REQUEST TO FIRM A 
You must now decide what annual salary to request from Firm A. 
Remember that if your request is among the highest 50% of the salary requests 
submitted, you will be laid off from Firm A and will immediately work for Firm B. 
If your salary request to Firm A is not among the highest 50%, you will continue 
to work for Firm A and will receive an annual salary equal to the lowest salary requested 
from the 50% of employees not retained. 
SALARY OFFERS FROM FIRM B 
Under each of the post-it notes below, you will find a salary offer from Firm B.  
The number on each post-it note represents each round of bidding.  You cannot share 
with other employees your offer from Firm B. 
During the experimental rounds, you will write your salary request to Firm A on 
the green stack of papers located in front of you.  Please look at these sheets now.  These 
green sheets of paper have the round number and your ID number on top.  Next to the 
word bid, you will submit your salary bid.  Once you have written your bid, fold it in half 
and raise it above your head for an experimenter to collect.  Once all bids are collected, 
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the results will be shown on the board in front of the class after every round.  If there is a 
tie, Firm A will retain one additional employee. 
Now turn your attention to the blue piece of paper titled “Salary Tracker.”  During 
the experiment you will use this sheet of paper to keep track of your salary received.  For 
each corresponding round, you will write “yes” if you are retained and “no” if you are not 
retained by Firm A in the corresponding second column.  If Firm A retains you, your 
salary will be displayed and circled on the board.  You will record that salary in the 
column titled “Salary.”  If Firm A does not retain you, you will write the salary offered to 
you from Firm B in the column titled “Salary.”   
My partner will now provide an example. (Appendix D includes the PowerPoint 
slides for the experiment explanations.) 
Now we will conduct the first round of experiments.  Turn to your yellow papers 
and remove the post-it note labeled “1.”  This is your offer from Firm B, submit your 
salary bid to Firm A on the green piece of paper entitled Round 1.  Once complete, fold 
and raise your paper above your head.  (Continue for rounds 2 through 10).  Once 
complete, pass out information for rounds 11 through 20.   
B. CASH BID PLUS NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES 
Now we will conduct the last ten rounds of the experiment.  Do not touch any of 
the papers in front of you until instructed to do so.  This portion of the experiment 
involves students making cash bids along with bids on non-monetary incentives.  Non-
monetary incentives, or NMIs, are rewards/benefits that are not money driven.  Examples 
of NMIs could be, but are not limited to, sabbatical, telecommunicating, reserved 
parking, on-site childcare, on-site gym, quality cafeteria, etc. 
You should have three stacks of papers in front of you, a yellow stack, a blue 
sheet, and a stack of pink sheets.  Please turn your attention to the yellow sheets, which 
should say “Survey—Cash Bid Plus Non-monetary Incentives” at the top left side of the 
paper.  Much of the information contained is similar to the previous 10 rounds of 
instructions.  As I read, I will state which sections have not changed from the previous 
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instructions.  Once again, your employee ID is located at the upper right hand side of the 
paper.  This will be your identification code throughout the remainder of the experiment. 
You can use the yellow papers as a reference if you need it at anytime during the 
rounds. The rounds will have all the same information and scenario.  It is simply 
provided as a reference in case you would like to go back and review the scenario 
description. 
I will now begin reading the description on your yellow paper.  Do not remove 
any of the post-it notes until instructed to do so.   
SCENARIO BACKGROUND 
You are an employee of Firm A.  The other students in the classroom are also 
employees of Firm A.  There are no other employees in Firm A besides the students in 
the classroom. 
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference between working for Firm A or for Firm B. 
You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you. 
Your only goal is to maximize your total income (monetary and non-monetary 
benefits/income) 
DOWNSIZING AT FIRM A 
No change. 
EMPLOYMENT OFFER FROM FIRM B 
No change. 
SALARY OFFER FROM FIRM B 
No change.  
DISTRIBUTION OF SALARY OFFERS FROM FIRM B 
No change.   
NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES AT FIRM A 
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Firm A now offers two non-monetary incentives that Firm B does not offer. 
You do not know the cost of these non-monetary incentives; you only know how 
you value each non-monetary incentive.   
SALARY SURVEY AT FIRM A 
The salary paid to any Firm A employee in previous years will have no influence 
on his/her future salary at Firm A.  Instead, the annual salary that Firm A will pay to each 
of its retained employees will be determined using a survey. 
Firm A is asking all its employees (all students in the classroom) to specify the 
minimum annual salary that he/she would need to receive in order to remain with Firm A.  
Once you determine your minimum annual salary to be retained, Firm A is then asking 
how much you would give up from that salary for each non-monetary incentive.  You 
will only receive a NMI if your bid for the NMI is greater than the cost to Firm A.   
Firm A will then pay the minimum salary necessary to voluntarily retain 50% of 
its employees.  In particular, after collecting all “salary requests” from its employees, 
Firm A will lay off the 50% of employees who submitted the highest salary requests. 
The employees laid off (50% of current Firm A employees) will immediately 
begin working at Firm B at the salary offered.  The remaining employees will continue to 
work for Firm A and receive those NMIs where their bid is greater than the non-monetary 
incentive cost to Firm A.   
All employees retained by Firm A will be paid a base salary minus the cost of any 
non-monetary incentives they will receive.  The base salary will be the lowest salary from 
the 50% of employees laid off. 
Note that this salary will be higher than the salary requested by any of the retained 
employees. 
Now, my partner will illustrate the bidding formula for NMIs. (Appendix D 
includes the PowerPoint slides for the experiment explanations.) 
Now, I will continue reading the description on the yellow sheets of paper.  
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YOUR SALARY REQUEST TO FIRM A 
You must now decide what annual salary to request from Firm A. 
Your overall salary request to Firm A will be an initial salary, minus your bid for 
each NMI you receive where your bid is greater than cost to Firm A.  Firm A will then 
calculate your cost to retain and use that as your competitive bid.  
Remember that if your request is among the highest 50% of the salary requests 
submitted, you will be laid off from Firm A and will immediately work for Firm B. 
If your salary request to Firm A is not among the highest 50%, you will continue 
to work for Firm A and will receive an annual base salary equal to the lowest salary 
requested from the 50% of employees not retained, plus any NMIs where your bid was 
greater than the cost.  Actual cash salary will be the base salary minus the cost of any 
NMIs received. 
SALARY OFFERS FROM FIRM B 
Under each of the post-it notes below, you will find a salary offer from Firm B.  
The number on each post-it note represents each round of bidding.  You cannot share 
with other employees your offer from Firm B.   
NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES AT FIRM A 
Also under each of the post-it notes below, you will find your value for each 
NMI.  This figure represents your value for each individual NMI. 
During the experimental rounds, you will write your salary request and bids for 
each non-monetary incentive to Firm A on the pink stack of papers located in front of 
you.  Please look at these sheets now.  These pink sheets of paper have the round number 
and your ID number on top.  Next to the words initial bid, you will submit your initial 
salary bid.  Below the words initial bid, next to the blank for each non-monetary 
incentive, you will submit your bid for the corresponding non-monetary incentive. Once 
you have written your bids, fold it in half and raise it above your head for an 
experimenter to collect.  Once all bids are collected, the results will be shown on the 
board in front of the class after every round. 
 59
Now turn your attention to the blue piece of paper titled “Salary and NMI 
Tracker.”  During the experiment you will use this sheet of paper to keep track of your 
salary received.  For each corresponding round, you will write “yes” if you are retained 
and “no” if you are not retained by Firm A in the corresponding second column.  If Firm 
A retains you, your cash salary will be displayed and circled on the board.  You will 
record that salary in the column titled “Cash Salary.”  Next, you will record any NMIs 
received in the column titled “NMI Received.”  If Firm A does not retain you, you will 
write the salary offered to you from Firm B in the column titled “Cash Salary” and write 
the word “None” under “NMI Received.”  If Firm A retains you, you will add your cash 
salary, which is the base salary minus the cost of any NMIs you received plus the value 
of each NMI received.  The value of each NMI is given on the yellow sheet of paper for 
the corresponding round.  This total is your “Value Received” and should be recorded in 
the corresponding column titled “Value Received.” If employed by Firm B, simply write 
your salary offer from Firm B in the column “Value Received.”   
My partner will now provide an example. (Appendix D includes the PowerPoint 
slides for the experiment explanations.) 
Now we will conduct the last ten rounds of the experiment.  Turn to your yellow 
papers and remove the post-it note labeled “11.”  This is your offer from Firm B and your 
value for each of the two NMIs offered at Firm A.  Submit your salary bid to Firm A on 
the pink piece of paper entitled Round 11.  Once complete, fold and raise your paper 
above your head.  (Continue for rounds 11 through 20). 
C. CONCLUSION 
Thank you for participating in this experiment for our MBA project. You will 
receive a brief during your next class period on the experiment and the hypothesis to your 
bidding strategies throughout the surveys.  
Please complete the Experiment Exit Survey and leave them face down on your 
desk prior to your departure.  
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APPENDIX D:  EXPERIMENT POWERPOINT EXPLANATIONS 
 
Figure 17.   Cash Bid Only Retention Explanation 
 
Figure 18.   Cash Bid Only Experiment Flow Chart 
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Figure 19.   Cash Plus Non-monetary Incentives Explanation  
 
Figure 20.   Cash Plus Non-monetary Incentive Retention Explanation 
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APPENDIX E:  EXPERIMENTAL DATA GRAPHS 
 
Figure 21.   True Value vs. Submitted Bids Round 1, Experiment 1 
 
Figure 22.   True Value vs. Submitted Bids Round 2, Experiment 1 
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Figure 23.   True Value vs. Submitted Bids Round 9, Experiment 1 
 
Figure 24.   True Value vs. Submitted Bids Round 10, Experiment 1 
 
Figure 25.   True Value vs. Submitted Bids Round 1, Experiment 2 
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Figure 26.   True Value vs. Submitted Bids Round 2, Experiment 2 
 
Figure 27.   True Value vs. Submitted Bids Round 9, Experiment 2 
 
Figure 28.   True Value vs. Submitted Bids Round 10, Experiment 2 
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